I mentioned this on Twitter, but I think the post in a sense, doesn't quite go far enough - obviously, I agree that accusations of weakmanning can usually be dismissed. But! I think actually talking about what is "representative of a group's beliefs" is an extremely difficult topic, for reasons I hope to write more of a post on, and not because "It's difficult to tell", but because "It's probably wrong to think of a group as actually having coherent positions and beliefs, and instead they have weird superpositions of possible beliefs and social dynamics where they hold or endorse contradictory beliefs simultaneously".
There's more - you said "Normally someone holding a belief for the wrong reasons is not enough to negate that belief. " I think I actually disagree. Obviously, someone could believe "1 + 1 = 2" for the reason "Yulia Tymoshenko told me in a dream", and that's not enough to say 1 + 1 = 2. But, I would say that people's beliefs about social things, or beliefs they hold because of a community or demographic they're part of, are *not* disconnected beliefs that only mean what they say, but weird nodes of meaning and feeling that exist to support the incoherent wrong reasons they used to believe something in the first place.
Or, perhaps this is clearer: Someone might have the belief "I believe in Free Speech", which I share, but because of the fact that all ideology is social, their belief means *other* things that just them stating it doesn't. It's as though we're speaking different dialects, and that the connotations around what "believing in free speech" mean in the outgroup dialect are actually totally different. We can sense this when we find ourselves wanting to resist someone saying something totally reasonable, hard to disagree with on the surface, but we know that accepting it is a trojan horse, not because it *leads* to agreeing with other arguments, but because it *is* multiple arguments simply self contained. It's why me and some conservative could talk about our beliefs in a way that makes them sound quiet similar - because we'd be avoiding the deeper premise iceberg underneath each of our surface statements, the place where we may be speaking an entirely different language.
And I think, for a really significant amount of things, this means it can be correct to dismiss a belief because it's held for the wrong reason, if you're sensitive to the deeper connotations underneath it.
This is the kind of thing I've been thinking a lot about - very difficult to describe, but I suppose in one sense, I'm saying "Most beliefs are not just beliefs".
Not significantly, no. I know that random juries are prone to cognitive biases and I absolutely play up to that. The most fitting application of advanced rationalist concepts is on the subject of forensic analysis but goddamn that's not something I'm likely to ever try again. I can try and discuss falsifiability, confirmation bias, availability heuristic, etc but all that swooshes right above a jury's head compared to the much tidier narrative the state analyst provides.
During jury selection, do you try and go for less intelligent jurors so they can be more easily swayed by emotion and logical fallacies? Especially for cases where the evidence may look more favorable to the prosecution.
I like Caplan's scale but don't like weakmanning as a concept here. The validity of choosing an argument to combat is not a measure of how weak it is, but of how representative or essential it is.
Really nutpicking seems to be the more apt term, though not necessarily with the insanity overtones.
Every time I hit 'post' I worry I forgot something, and you've demonstrated how valid my fear is here. Nutpicking is absolutely relevant here and I'm embarrassed I forgot to loop it in.
When arguing on interesting but abstract topics, you should avoid weakmanning.
When arguing as a citizen on the affairs of the day, you should argue whatever argument is the driving force behind the crazy, *especially if it is the weakman*. To argue against some sanewashed chimera of the actual argument is to be distracted and to play into the oppositions motte-and-bailey tactic. Attack them where they are weakest, they deserve it.
Perhaps more importantly, even if you end up losing, then you've prevented the worst of the damage. In most places "defund the police" either didn't happen or was at least defanged because it's fucking crazy. But in hard-left strongholds like Portland it did a lot of damage, because even if some of the people passing it believed in the sanewashed version, they had no defense against the crazies who used them.
I mentioned this on Twitter, but I think the post in a sense, doesn't quite go far enough - obviously, I agree that accusations of weakmanning can usually be dismissed. But! I think actually talking about what is "representative of a group's beliefs" is an extremely difficult topic, for reasons I hope to write more of a post on, and not because "It's difficult to tell", but because "It's probably wrong to think of a group as actually having coherent positions and beliefs, and instead they have weird superpositions of possible beliefs and social dynamics where they hold or endorse contradictory beliefs simultaneously".
There's more - you said "Normally someone holding a belief for the wrong reasons is not enough to negate that belief. " I think I actually disagree. Obviously, someone could believe "1 + 1 = 2" for the reason "Yulia Tymoshenko told me in a dream", and that's not enough to say 1 + 1 = 2. But, I would say that people's beliefs about social things, or beliefs they hold because of a community or demographic they're part of, are *not* disconnected beliefs that only mean what they say, but weird nodes of meaning and feeling that exist to support the incoherent wrong reasons they used to believe something in the first place.
Or, perhaps this is clearer: Someone might have the belief "I believe in Free Speech", which I share, but because of the fact that all ideology is social, their belief means *other* things that just them stating it doesn't. It's as though we're speaking different dialects, and that the connotations around what "believing in free speech" mean in the outgroup dialect are actually totally different. We can sense this when we find ourselves wanting to resist someone saying something totally reasonable, hard to disagree with on the surface, but we know that accepting it is a trojan horse, not because it *leads* to agreeing with other arguments, but because it *is* multiple arguments simply self contained. It's why me and some conservative could talk about our beliefs in a way that makes them sound quiet similar - because we'd be avoiding the deeper premise iceberg underneath each of our surface statements, the place where we may be speaking an entirely different language.
And I think, for a really significant amount of things, this means it can be correct to dismiss a belief because it's held for the wrong reason, if you're sensitive to the deeper connotations underneath it.
This is the kind of thing I've been thinking a lot about - very difficult to describe, but I suppose in one sense, I'm saying "Most beliefs are not just beliefs".
Just wondering, do you often apply rationalist/SSC/LessWrong style arguments in your trials? I’d love to see a rationalist lawyer persuading a jury.
Not significantly, no. I know that random juries are prone to cognitive biases and I absolutely play up to that. The most fitting application of advanced rationalist concepts is on the subject of forensic analysis but goddamn that's not something I'm likely to ever try again. I can try and discuss falsifiability, confirmation bias, availability heuristic, etc but all that swooshes right above a jury's head compared to the much tidier narrative the state analyst provides.
During jury selection, do you try and go for less intelligent jurors so they can be more easily swayed by emotion and logical fallacies? Especially for cases where the evidence may look more favorable to the prosecution.
Definitely not, because you can't predict which way they'll sway.
I like Caplan's scale but don't like weakmanning as a concept here. The validity of choosing an argument to combat is not a measure of how weak it is, but of how representative or essential it is.
Really nutpicking seems to be the more apt term, though not necessarily with the insanity overtones.
Every time I hit 'post' I worry I forgot something, and you've demonstrated how valid my fear is here. Nutpicking is absolutely relevant here and I'm embarrassed I forgot to loop it in.
Not detracting from your piece! Enjoyed reading it and taking in the concepts here, just adding to the discourse.
When arguing on interesting but abstract topics, you should avoid weakmanning.
When arguing as a citizen on the affairs of the day, you should argue whatever argument is the driving force behind the crazy, *especially if it is the weakman*. To argue against some sanewashed chimera of the actual argument is to be distracted and to play into the oppositions motte-and-bailey tactic. Attack them where they are weakest, they deserve it.
Perhaps more importantly, even if you end up losing, then you've prevented the worst of the damage. In most places "defund the police" either didn't happen or was at least defanged because it's fucking crazy. But in hard-left strongholds like Portland it did a lot of damage, because even if some of the people passing it believed in the sanewashed version, they had no defense against the crazies who used them.
I agree with this advice.
>I dare you to use this phrase at a dinner party without getting kicked out.
The rest of the article is quite good, but you overestimate my ability to get invited to dinner parties.
IF you ever do get invited, I'd want you to maximize the chances of it happening again
It is always a delight to read you.